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Abstract 
Information Age organizations are complex and dynamic “living” 
entities that interact with and influence their environments. People 
are the building blocks—creative and intelligent components with a 
latent ability to produce not only stipulated outcomes but also novel 
ideas and achievements. This realization is a dramatic departure 
from the traditional conceptualization of organizations as mindless 
machines that churn out prescribed, formulaic products and 
solutions in an industrial fashion. When visualized and treated as 
living systems, organizations more readily exploit emergent 
technologies, as well as the human potential to innovate and adapt. 
To realize their full potential, adaptive organizations must also be 
capable of managing and even encouraging disruptive change.  
Adaptive organizations possess markedly cooperative characteristics 
that operate on trust, open information flow, and responsiveness to 
technological innovation. They are not based on or hostage to a set 
of inviolate roles, policies, and structures that form the rigid pillars 
for success. Rather, they purposefully reconfigure these important 
organizational components to support each new project or activity. 
Business models are changed as necessary. 
Organizational transformation requires deep understanding of the 
operational environment, ability to shape structure and processes to 
perform optimally, and rapid action to exploit opportunities to exert 
influence and maintain competitive advantage. Actions are followed 
by careful evaluation of outcomes, which in turn leads to new 
understanding and subsequent adaptations. This may be codified into 
a continuous process: understand → shape → act → evaluate. This 
essay will also provide tangible evidence of how this process can 
facilitate rapid organizational assimilation of new technology and 
people innovations. 
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Introduction 
Jingshen is the Mandarin word for spirit and vivacity. It is an 
important word for those who would lead, because above all 
things, spirit and vivacity set effective organizations apart from 
those that will decline and die.1 
odern organizations must be prepared to operate in a 
dynamic, information-saturated environment with 
increasingly porous boundaries. Ideas, creativity, and 
information services are the highly marketable commodities of the 
moment. Whole business entities have vacated their brick and mortar 
confines to float freely in the ether of cyberspace. Perhaps the most 
encouraging trend is the enhanced virtual interaction and collaboration 
among organizations, their people, and the recipients of the 
organization’s product or service. 
Technological innovations such as the Internet and satellite 
communications have fundamentally altered how organizations must 
relate to their stakeholders and the ambient environment in which they 
operate. In the commercial sector, companies like Amazon, Priceline, 
and eBay stake their entire business model on active consumer 
participation and feedback. These cyber-middlemen have resurrected 
barter commerce. They provide powerful tools for collaboration such as 
prominently posted reviews, product blogs and discussion, and 
facilitated correspondence and transactions between vendors and end-
users. Even traditionally autocratic and highly structured defense 
organizations are incrementally implementing fundamental 
organizational changes such as decentralization and network centricity. 
Military organizations are actively seeking innovative solutions from 
academia and industry, along with the pragmatic creativity of junior 
military leaders as they grapple with sophisticated and elusive 
adversaries.  
Despite these changes, organizations remain functionally static. At a 
fundamental level, an organization provides a structured model for its 
constituent entities that establishes purpose, fends off aggressive 
competition, and passes knowledge between contemporaries and from 
generation to generation. Organizations do not fulfill these basic 
                                                     
1 James L. Hayes, Memos for Management: Leadership (New York: 
AMACOM Books, 1983), 51. 
M 
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functions differently today from how they have since early civilization. 
It is the form of the organization that is in a state of constant 
evolution—optimizing its component parts to best respond to the 
environmental conditions of the moment, girding to grapple with new 
and unfamiliar problems, and improving the ability to gather, 
understand, and communicate information. The simple fact that 
organizations are and have always been adaptive has long been a topic 
for popular discussion and philosophical and political debate. For at 
least the past 50 years, it also has been a field of deliberate scientific 
study that sees organizations as complex adaptive systems.  
A complex adaptive system can be defined as an entity that 
“behaves/evolves according to three key principles: order is emergent 
as opposed to predetermined, the system's history is irreversible, and 
the system's future is often unpredictable.”2 Certainly, modern 
organizations neatly fit this definition. Human history drifts between 
periods of alternating stability and disruption, more or less neatly 
bracketed by historians into “eras,” with each era building from its 
predecessor. At this macro-temporal level, organizations tend to evolve 
more radically during the chaotic periods between eras. The 
contemporary era is popularly conceived to be occupying a wildly 
entropic time-space between the end of the Industrial Age and the 
beginning of a new era, which has been more or less accurately 
described as the Information Age. Regardless of the moniker, nations at 
the forefront are exporting Industrial Era productivity to the developing 
world, with important implications for the future. In the lead countries 
that are shaping globalization, the focus has shifted from productivity 
to agility—efficiency is trumped by flexibility, generic mass-
production by service specialization, and compliance by innovation. 
That said, this shift is not unprecedented, as it pertains to the 
consideration of organizations as complex, adaptive systems. The 
fundamental difference between post-Industrialism and previous eras is 
that there is an opportunity to shape change deliberately rather than 
reactively. “Information Age” accurately describes our current 
cognitive space: We are able to develop a “deep” understanding of our 
environment through novel technologies that are already influencing 
changes in the way we think, organize, and interact. In fact, the 
relatively new treatment of organizations as living, evolving entities 
                                                     
2Kevin Dooley, “A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organizational 
Change,” Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, & Life Science, 1999;1(1):69–97. 
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may already be passé. Rather than adapting in the random or reactive 
fashion of natural evolution, our potential for “deep understanding” 
may offer us opportunities to transform organizations proactively and 
shape our environment deliberately to maintain competitive advantage. 
Eras of radical change are generally tied to a paradigm-altering 
cognitive breakthrough, either instigated or enabled by technological 
advances. The introduction of agriculture, the preservation of ideas in 
writing, the harnessing of energy to produce electricity, and most 
recently, the creation and occupation of cyberspace have fundamentally 
altered the whole of human civilization. To navigate the disruption 
zones that herald these eras of revolutionary change, organizations 
must rapidly adapt or face obsolescence and ultimate extinction.  
Before the advent of agriculture, human society conformed to a 
natural evolutionary progression; that is, its organizations and their 
adaptations were shaped by the physical environment. Agriculture was 
the first meaningful effort undertaken by humans to fundamentally alter 
their environment in a deliberate fashion, based on a new understanding 
of how things naturally worked and, with a bit of ingenuity and 
technological know-how, could work better to suit human needs. Even 
so, it took thousands of years for hunter–gatherer societies to give way 
to agrarianism, and illiterate civilizations thrived for millennia after the 
first Sumerian marked cuneiform onto clay. These historical 
innovations, which form the very basis of the ultimate complex 
adaptive organization—modern global civilization—occurred over a 
vast expanse of time. In contrast, the last two centuries have known 
almost constant change. The dizzying pace of modern-era 
revolutions—accessible energy and instantaneous communication 
grids, ventures into outer space, the realization of cyberspace—has 
radically and perhaps irrevocably shaped the ambient environment 
through the creation and occupation of previously unreachable or even 
unfathomable domains. Not content with merely changing our 
environment, humans are now exploring ways to shape our very 
essence as human beings as we begin to understand and exploit 
genetics, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnologies.3 
The implications for post-Industrial organizations are profound. The 
pace of radical change is widening the gap between technological 
                                                     
3 U.S. Joint Forces Command, “The Joint Operating Environment 2008: 
Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force.” Available at 
https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/J5/J59/default.aspx. 
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possibilities and the ability of organizations to assimilate technology 
responsibly, purposefully, and ethically. A proactive, nonsequential 
approach to organizational adaptation combines four essential cognitive 
capabilities: 
Understand → Shape → Act → Evaluate 
First, organizations must understand themselves, their competitors, 
and their operational space. To survive and thrive, they must use 
innovation and technological enablers to shape both internal structures 
and fluid environmental conditions to ideally suit an organizational 
purpose. This understanding and preparation of a favorable ambient 
setting enables organizations to act with clear purpose and evaluate the 
outcomes of their actions and to determine both the immediate and 
potential long-term effects that will affect future understanding, form, 
and action, and indeed might either confirm or refute the continued 
relevance of an organization’s purpose.4  
Understand: Attaining “Deep Knowledge” 
Kill our worst ideas before they kill us.5 
The first step in achieving deliberate and desirable organizational 
adaptation is to attain a holistic understanding, or “deep knowledge,”6 
of self, peers and competitors, and the environment. Deep knowledge 
requires a departure from traditional ideas about organizational purpose 
and management.  
The first conceptual hurdle is the notion of replacing control with 
agility. Agility, in fact, is the “critical capability that organizations need 
to meet the challenges of complexity and uncertainty.”7 Deep 
knowledge is based, ironically, on the concession that being able to 
unerringly forecast, much less control, the future operational 
                                                     
4 David C. Gompert, “Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counter-
Insurgency,” RAND Counter-Insurgency Study Paper 1, prepared for the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense by the Rand National Defense Research 
Institute, Santa Monica (2007). 
5 Joseph M. Firestone, “Reducing Risk by Killing Your Worst Ideas,” 
Knowledge Management Consortium International, 2004:6. 
6 Mark W. McElroy, “The New Knowledge Management,” Knowledge & 
Innovation: Journal of the KMCI, 2000;1(1):43–67. 
7 David S. Alberts, “Agility, Focus, and Convergence: The Future of 
Command and Control,” The International C2 Journal, 2007;1(1):3. 
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environment is impossible. This realization does not mean that 
organizations should not bother to build future strategies—quite the 
contrary. For adaptive organizations, future planning simply shifts from 
a focus on control to a posture of careful monitoring and agile response 
based on a range of potential future scenarios. Planning for plausible 
future scenarios, coupled with continuous feedback from environmental 
scanning, can enhance awareness and increase responsiveness in an 
uncertain environment.8  
Over 30 years ago, Shell Oil Company was one of the early 
developers of a “flexible response” approach to operating in an 
uncertain future.9 In the late 1960s, rampant nationalization of global 
oil reserves sparked a disruptive change in the supply-side dynamic. 
When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
emerged on the global scene in 1960, Shell recognized that this shift in 
the control of oil supplies from private industry to state entities might 
significantly alter the standing set of objectives, incentives, and 
practices that formed the foundation of the enterprise. Shell projects 
that were based on previous industry forecasts were failing, and the 
company’s strategic planners began to recognize that planning future 
projects that were aligned with a single future scenario on the basis of 
past precedent was an unacceptably risky endeavor. They looked to the 
then-groundbreaking work of open-systems theorists Daniel Katz and 
Robert Kahn,10 who asserted that when faced with an uncertain future, 
it is important to first determine which variables remain predictable. 
Then, based on what can be accurately predicted, a few plausible 
scenarios might emerge for future planning.  
After careful consideration of a short list of planning scenarios, 
Shell adapted their business model to accommodate this new-found 
understanding of how to mitigate risk in an uncertain future. Project 
designers considered how their efforts might support a broader range of 
                                                     
8 Kees van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, 2d 
ed. (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 83–85. 
9 “Shell Global Scenarios to 2025,” (The Hague: Royal Dutch Shell, Shell 
Group, 2005), 8. 
10 Daniel Katz and Robert Khan were pioneers of social-systems theory. 
One of their early texts, The Social Psychology of Organizations (West 
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), first published in 1966 and revised in 
1978, is fundamental reading for social-systems theorists. This observation 
and its influence on the oil industry in the 1970s are found on pages 130–131 
of the 1978 edition. 
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future scenarios, emphasizing agile and responsive capabilities that 
could address not only the most likely futures but also the most 
dangerous scenarios. In the case of scenario development for the 
nationalization of oil supplies, Shell’s planners used global demand as 
their predetermined, or predictable, variable. Because demand was 
unlikely to change, this increased the weight of the supply-side 
variables. Initially, the planning team also considered supply to be 
fairly stable and that the most likely outcome was that state-controlled 
supply points would continue to generate anticipated oil production 
outputs. They also, however, considered a most-dangerous scenario, in 
which a major producer state or collective might alter production for 
national or political purposes not directly related to economic gain. 
Shell planners considered this to be the crisis scenario, and their project 
development efforts were arranged to be responsive to both these and 
other plausible futures. 
After Shell’s project development was aligned to be responsive to 
multiple future scenarios, it became imperative to determine the key 
indicators that a particular future scenario was emerging, which would 
trigger subsequent decisions and resource commitments. For the Shell 
scenarios, one obviously critical indicator was a political event that 
might encourage negative changes in nationalized (mostly Arab) crude 
oil extraction and distribution. The continued expansion of OPEC 
throughout the 1960s and the nationalization of Libyan oil under 
President Muammar Kaddafi in 1969 were significant indicators of the 
increasing potential for a most dangerous scenario outcome. Shell 
braced for the storm just as the Yom Kippur War between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors erupted in 1973. By the time OPEC producers imposed 
their devastating embargoes against Israel’s supporters in the war, Shell 
had already recognized the implications and rapidly reduced its Middle 
East commitments and reliance on OPEC-controlled supply lines. To 
do this, Shell invested heavily in liquefied natural gas, developed 
supertankers to minimize traffic to and from supply chokepoints in the 
Arabian Gulf, began diversifying its energy portfolio to include coal 
and nuclear power, and shifted exploration from the Arabian Peninsula 
to the North Sea.11 Though hardly immune from the effects of the 1973 
embargo, Shell’s responsive shifts ensured that the company would be 
among those that would survive the resultant industry crunch. 
                                                     
11 Royal Dutch Shell, “Shell Global Scenarios,” 22–26, 68–71. 
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At the end of the Cold War two decades later, the United States 
military likewise found itself in a future-planning quandary. A 
European ground war or nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union had 
long been the myopic future planning priority. With the sudden 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the ascension of small and 
nonaligned nations into the nuclear family, not to mention the 
emergence of ideologically motivated transnational terrorist 
organizations on the global scene, future-conflict scenarios began to 
look far more messy and unpredictable.  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the most devastating 
attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor, highlighted just how uncertain 
the present and future security environment had become. The potential 
list of external threats had dramatically expanded, and it was clear that 
any attempt to focus narrowly on a particular group of adversaries 
would result in catastrophic response capability shortfalls against 
unanticipated challenges. The defense community radically altered the 
threat-focused planning paradigm to be more capabilities-based in an 
effort to prepare agile and responsive forces that would be able to 
effectively counter a broad range of threats. Similar to the Shell 
planning model, capabilities-based planning addresses environmental 
uncertainty by considering a wide range of possible scenarios; it then 
generates capability requirements that are applicable and essential to 
success in all of the scenario conditions.12 
Shape: Adapting Organizations for Uncertain Futures 
Organizational capabilities represent the last truly sustainable 
source of competitive advantage.13 
For the U.S. Department of Defense, the conceptual shift to 
capabilities-based planning and an adaptive, agile posture compelled 
significant organizational changes. The development of a flexible 
capabilities-based force would demand organizations with a broad 
mission set, an inclusive and cooperative mentality, a willingness to 
accept calculated risks, and a painful divorce from platform-centric 
                                                     
12 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Defense, 2006), 59. 
13 David Nadler and Michael Tushman, Competing by Design: The Power 
of Organizational Architecture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
252. 
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affinities.14 To become more adaptive, the armed forces would have to 
develop unfamiliar and uncomfortable cooperative characteristics 
founded on trust, the open flow of information, and a willingness to 
embrace technological innovation. Time-honored hierarchies would 
have to be deliberately blurred so that creativity could percolate from 
the ground up. Dogmatic doctrine could no longer hold leaders hostage 
to a prescribed set of actions. Still, Vietnam lingered as a painful 
example of the deliberate and wholesale “unlearning” of valuable 
skills, lessons, and traditions. There could be no blank page or clean 
slate; the defense community would have to respect the lessons of 
history as they purposefully reconfigured their still-valuable 
organizational components to support complex operations in a 
multifaceted environment.  
The military knew that it would need to maximize the combined 
potential of the service components and began in 1999 by establishing 
the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the agency to 
implement this crucial change. One of USJFCOM’s first challenges 
was to develop a means to rapidly deploy a situation-tailored joint 
command cell with associated joint forces that would be prepared for 
and effective at immediate crisis response. The prototype organizations 
that emerged were a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) for 
crisis planning and readiness and the Joint Task Force (JTF), 
comprising a headquarters (HQ) with assigned service and functional 
components.  
The SJFHQ operates under a high-ranking director and supporting 
Command Group staffed by joint-qualified military and civilian 
personnel. The organization comprises cross-functional teams—
operations, plans, information superiority, and knowledge 
management—that accomplish daily mission requirements. These 
teams operate within a knowledge-based environment that emphasizes 
seamless, cross-functional collaboration between the teams, with the 
regional combatant command staffs and components, and with other 
external agencies.15 In pre-crisis, the SJFHQ serves as a planning staff 
element that identifies likely future crisis scenarios, then establishes 
                                                     
14 Michael Fitzsimmons, “Whither Capabilities-Based Planning,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly, 2007;44:101–105. 
15 Major General Gordon C. Nash, U.S. Marine Corps, “Doctrinal 
Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ),” The Joint 
Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 3, June 16, 2003, 7–8.  
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and maintains situational understanding and planning options for 
critical geographic areas designated by a combatant commander.  
When an actual crisis emerges, the operational commander must 
determine whether to build and deploy a JTF. Unlike the SJFHQ, JTFs 
and their headquarters are ad hoc organizations established on a 
geographic area or functional basis when the mission has a specific 
limited objective.16 For events that are limited in duration and scope, 
the commander may opt to designate the SJFHQ as the core of the JTF 
HQ. More commonly, however, essential portions of the SJFHQ 
accelerate the transition of a service operational HQ to a JTF HQ, 
which is equipped with so-called plug-and-play force packages that are 
ready to go and particularly well-suited to the crisis at hand. From 2005 
to 2008, USJFCOM SJFHQ core elements Alpha and Bravo deployed 
domestically to JTF Katrina and supported Multinational Forces Iraq, 
Combined Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan, JTF Lebanon, 
International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, and the Combined 
JTF Horn of Africa.17 
One of the greatest challenges for every JTF HQ is how to quickly 
grasp the situation in the midst of a crisis response. The staff needs 
time to achieve full situational understanding and become functionally 
effective amid a maelstrom of hasty deployment, unfamiliar players, 
imminent resource demands, and sometimes conflicting or confused 
directives from outside the immediate operational space. Operational 
experience and demand over time demonstrated that a more agile, 
responsive, and tailorable organization than the SJFHQ was required. 
On October 1, 2008, the SJFHQ adapted and transitioned to a new Joint 
Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC).18 
Similar to its predecessor, the “JECC serves as the USJFCOM 
subordinate command responsible for providing forces to newly-
established joint force headquarters that can rapidly enable critical 
                                                     
16 Joint Publication 3-33: "Joint Task Force Headquarters" (February 15, 
2007). Available at I-3. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_33.pdf 
17 “Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ-CE).” U.S. 
Joint Forces Command. Fact Sheet. (Norfolk, VA: 2005). 
18 Courtney E. Howard, “USJFCOM Transitions Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters,” USNORTHCOM Bulletin Board, September 30, 2008. 
Available at http://community.mae.pennnet.com/group/bulletinboard/forum/ 
topics/2108638:Topic:1845. 
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command and control capabilities.”19 The joint-enabling capabilities 
available to combatant commanders include Joint Deployable Teams 
with capabilities in four critical areas: operations, plans, information 
superiority/knowledge management, and logistics. In addition to these 
core staff teams, the JECC offers enabling capabilities in a Joint 
Communications Support Element, Joint Public Affairs Support 
Element, and Intelligence–Quick Reaction teams.20 The seven types of 
deployable teams can immediately offer joint structure, immediate 
availability, and mission-specific planning and intelligence capabilities, 
which provide the JTF HQ with the means to rapidly determine its 
courses of action and prepare and deploy an effective response.21  
The SJFHQ and JECC organizational innovations have improved 
joint response at the regional and operational level, but their role is 
really to identify, recommend, and augment the requirements needed by 
a service-dependent JTF HQ for effective crisis response. Joint 
combatant commanders, with the exception of Special Operations 
Command, possess very few organic resources and rely almost entirely 
on personnel and assets from their constituent services to manage their 
areas of responsibility. Although all of the services are starting to 
embrace jointness in practice, contemporary pundits question the 
dependence on individual services to provide the capabilities the JTF 
HQs need, decrying it as wasteful, competitive, and redundant. Many 
critics suggest a more centrally controlled process to develop and 
manage joint capabilities—one that emphasizes efficiency and 
interdependence over the current characteristics of service 
specialization, limited organic sustainability, and interoperability.22  
This option, though inarguably more cost-effective and joint-
spirited, is not without its own risks. If the current, service-oriented 
capability packages are to be homogenized through joint capability 
development, over time the unique domain affinities (sea, air, land), 
institutional experiences, cultures, and lessons learned will become 
diluted. Service distinction and competition, as well as cooperation, can 
                                                     
19 Joint Forces Command, “Joint Enabling Capabilities Command.” 
Available at http://www.jfcom.mil/about/com_jecc.html. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Douglas K. Zimmerman, “Understanding the Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters,” Military Review 2004;(July-August):28–29. 
22 Kathleen H. Hicks et al., Transitioning Defense Organizational 
Initiatives: An Assessment of Key 2001-2008 Defense Reforms (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), 56–64. 
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spur innovation and produce novel concepts when well-managed. 
Moreover, enforcing joint interdependence over joint interoperability 
risks single-point failures that jeopardize mission success. The long-
term solution may be to promote joint development for universally 
applicable capabilities while retaining those distinct service-specific 
assets that preserve effective institutional roles for the U.S. Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marines.  
The JECC and its predecessor provide a cogent example of how 
leadership, composition, structure, and responsibilities can be carefully 
shaped to better respond to the conditions imposed by the operational 
environment. In the commercial sector, Google offers a more profound 
example of shaping, in which the organization not only adapts to 
respond to crises in a rapidly changing competitive environment but 
also strives to incorporate the environmental conditions and its resident 
enterprises into its own organizational architecture. Google’s mission 
“to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible 
and useful”23 is a bold statement of transcendence of the competitive 
state to a space where goals and accomplishment are measured in 
absolute terms and the innovations of peers are viewed as collective 
opportunity. Shared information, and particularly networked 
information, is at the same time Google’s product, mantra, and 
operational domain.  
Google’s organizational structure is an amazingly simple hub-and-
spoke construct, with Google as the self-described information 
“keystone” that connects information suppliers (media, academia, 
industry, and individuals) with consumers, advertisers, and innovators 
to populate an “innovation ecosystem.” When a non-Google innovator 
creates a new information product or platform, rather than attempting to 
thwart the “competitor,” Google attempts to incorporate the new 
contributor into the network. Given the incentives—access to Google’s 
information tools, marketing data, and revenue-sharing, among 
others—few would-be competitors can resist Google’s magnetism. In 
fact, in Google’s flourishing innovation ecosystem, competition has 
become passé, replaced by a “mash-up” of diverse information 
products and services that pass fluidly through traditional 
organizational boundaries to the mutual benefit of all stakeholders.24  
                                                     
23 http://www.google.com/enterprise/whygoogle.html 
24 Bala Iyer and Thomas H. Davenport, “Reverse Engineering Google’s 
Innovation Machine,” Harvard Business Review 2008;86(4):59–68. 
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Google is now hosting the Android software platform as one 
emerging means to offer a diverse array of information-based 
capabilities in one convenient consumer tool. Android is an open-
standards telecommunication platform that not only offers free Google 
products but also combines the capabilities of a range of available tools 
to create a consumer-responsive experience. For example, Android can 
combine the information in the user network’s “contact” database, GPS 
applications, and Google Maps to allow Android users to locate friends 
in the Android network or automatically send alerts when an Android 
contact is within a designated geographical range. Without much 
imagination, the potential uses for this application could extend well 
beyond social networking to provide parents the ability to monitor 
children, allow victims of violent crime to avoid paroled offenders, or 
assist first responders in arriving quickly to a medical emergency. 
Though some of these technologies are available today, they are 
prohibitively expensive for broad public use. Android offers these and 
many other capabilities as a free feature, while simultaneously using its 
“open standards” status to encourage future Android-supported 
innovation.25 
Act: Exploiting the Time-Information Advantage 
The habit of control must yield to the power of networking.26 
In today’s information-rich environment, organizational shaping 
must work with informed reasoning to facilitate effective planning and 
action. Global information networks provide unprecedented 
opportunities to meld intuition and reasoning for rapid and adaptive 
decision-making. To benefit fully from this opportunity, however, 
organizations must be collaborative, decentralized, and pliable. In a 
diffuse and fluid competitive environment, centralized decision-making 
may be fatally unresponsive; in contrast, a “need-to-share” 
organizational mindset, supported by a distributed information network, 
can give leaders and managers in the field unobstructed access to 
information, the authority to act, and opportunities for collaboration, 
helping them gain a time-information advantage over their opponents.  
There are four essential cognitive capabilities that must be 
functioning harmoniously to realize the time-information advantage: 
                                                     
25 http://www.android.com 
26 Gompert, “Heads We Win,” xi–xii. 
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anticipation, opportunism, decision speed, and learning in action.27 
Intuition provides initial direction, creating the opportunity to gather 
information and reason rapidly via networks to anticipate future 
conditions. Accurate anticipation sustains ownership of the initiative so 
that fleeting opportunities can be exploited through rapid-adaptive 
decisions. Through information-enabled anticipation, opportunism, and 
rapid-adaptive decision-making, organizations can gain a potentially 
decisive time-information advantage over competitors. Time saved 
through anticipation is used to gain information; then superior 
information is exploited to gain more time. Meanwhile, learning and 
adapting “on the fly” ensures that organizations do not fall into 
complacency or predictable actions. 
The Federal Aviation Administration’s collaborative decision-
making project shows how decisions reached through well-informed 
teamwork can lead to effective action. Begun in 1990, the collaborative 
decision-making initiative is an effort to improve air traffic 
management through information sharing between industry 
stakeholders in “government, general aviation, airlines, private industry 
and academia who are working together to create technological and 
procedural solutions to traffic flow problems that face the National 
Airspace System (NAS).”28  
Collaborative decision-making participants cooperate and share 
information to increase their situational awareness, and thus their 
capacity for collective decision-making. Through an actively 
maintained and user-updated Intranet, all of an airport’s partners share 
the same operational picture, which in turn dramatically improves the 
timely anticipation and mitigation of potential scheduling conflicts, 
smoothes passenger flow between terminals, and alerts the entire 
aviation network to potential hazards. This network also serves as an 
invaluable data repository and analysis tool that automatically collects 
and processes information to streamline airspace flow and flight 
scheduling. Automated information management has compressed 90 
days’ worth of data analysis into as little 30 minutes.29 By sharing what 
                                                     
27 Ibid, xi. 
28 Federal Aviation Administration, “Collaborative Decision-Making 
Leadership Guide” (January 6, 2009). Available at http://cdm.fly.faa.gov/ 
whatscdm/cdmdocs.html [Accessed March 10, 2009]. 
29 Terence R. Thompson et al., "Terminal-Area Throughput: Measuring 
Capacity and Robustness,” Eurocontrol ATM R&D Symposium white paper, 
Budapest, June 2003. 
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had long been considered proprietary industry data via an inclusive 
information network, the entire aviation community has benefited from 
enhanced awareness, efficiency, and cost savings, and passengers have 
been spared an estimated 50,000 hours of air delays since the 
program’s inception.30  
A similar catharsis has occurred in the defense sector. The current 
conflict in Afghanistan demonstrates how a technologically enabled 
time-information advantage has helped shape rigid military 
organizational structures to be more agile and responsive at the 
operational level. Following successful major combat operations in 
2002, U.S. operational tasks shifted to nation-building—an unfamiliar 
and daunting task. Because the security environment was still deadly 
and domestic capacity nonexistent, it fell largely on an ill-suited 
military occupation force to rebuild an Afghan central government that 
could establish and maintain rule of law and good governance. The 
capability requirements for this extremely complex task were extensive, 
dynamic, and unfamiliar to military planners and leaders. Numerous 
environmental uncertainties, and especially the influence of key figures 
such as President Hamid Karzai and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, 
loomed large and even appeared to hold success or failure in the 
balance.31 
The complexities associated with propping up a viable central 
government in Afghanistan while maintaining interim stability through 
a rotating assortment of multinational and interagency players has since 
been addressed in large part by the U.S. creation of a new operational-
level organization: the provincial reconstruction team (PRT).32 A 
radical departure for the military, a PRT is designed as a more or less 
“flat” organization, wherein military representatives comingle with 
peer-level civilian officials from the U.S. departments of State, 
Agriculture, and Treasury as they cooperate closely with Afghan 
agencies and nongovernmental and international aid organizations. The 
exact organizational compositions, hierarchies, coverage areas, and 
tasks vary widely among a few dozen of these malleable “people-
                                                     
30 Ibid. 
31 Kathleen Hicks and Eric Ridge, “Planning for Stability Operations: The 
Use of Capabilities-Based Approaches,” a report of the International Security 
Program (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2007), 16–22. 
32 James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From 
Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 136. 
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centric” networks, according to each military commander’s 
comprehensive needs assessment, the PRT’s primary regional 
challenges, and even the personal relationships and interactions of its 
stakeholders.  
Multinational partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
International Security Assistance Force have since adopted their own 
renditions of the PRT model and further emphasized the diverse 
organizational possibilities inherent to the construct. As the 
Netherlands Defence Staff eloquently observed, “Working in PRTs is a 
complex and demanding task, which makes detailed understanding of 
the mission, the environmental conditions and the formal and informal 
influential actors essential. PRTs are not based on a rigid doctrinal 
concept and the concepts behind reconstruction and the military 
contribution to it are in a state of rapid development. Concepts related 
to PRTs are therefore also evolving constantly.”33 Despite or perhaps 
because of these ever-shifting requirements, the PRT model continues 
to endure and evolve in one of the globe’s most intractable disruption 
zones, ever striving to improve agility and unified responsiveness in the 
face of uncertainty, austerity, and hostility. 
Evaluate: Defining, Determining, and Enhancing 
Success 
The understanding of instability is . . . derived from analysis fed from 
many sources . . . information that feeds these plans is vulnerable to 
subjectivity, is rarely quantifiable, is difficult to measure and is 
infrequently reviewed.34 
PRTs offer invaluable insights into the importance of a regular 
evaluation of environmental conditions, shaping efforts, and action 
outcomes. The joint force commander must expect that, however 
carefully conceived, his initial operational design might prove 
inadequate. The PRT plan must incorporate means of continuously 
assessing the results of operations in relation to expectations and be 
                                                     
33 Joint Doctrine Bulletin 2008/01, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ 
deployment in Afghanistan,” Netherlands Defence Staff, Defence 
Staff/DOBBP/Doctrine Division, The Hague (2008): iii. Available at 
http://www.yourdefence.nl/file.php/1/moddata/forum/2/247/JDB_0801_PRT_
OPS_English_version.pdf.  
34 T. R. Brewer, “Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework: Trial Report” 
(TF Helmand, NATO International Security Assistance Force, 2008), iii. 
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prepared to modify operations when the two diverge. By probing the 
situation, operations themselves become a way of testing early 
assumptions and expectations.35  
In Afghanistan, the United Kingdom is part of the International 
Security and Assistance Force, with a charter to stabilize Afghanistan 
and “set it on a path toward economic development and increased 
political freedoms.”36 Britain’s Afghanistan PRT, located in Helmand 
province, comprises representatives and resource contributions from its 
Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and 
Department for International Development. The British PRT’s 
activities in Helmand are driven by the Helmand Road Map, a 2-year 
plan under annual evaluation. According to the plan, civil and military 
activities center on five main geographical areas, controlled by a 
politically led counterinsurgency campaign. This approach depends on 
the consent of the population and its support for the government at least 
as much as on holding ground or eliminating the Taliban. For this 
reason, military tasks are designed with a “civilian effects” purpose.37  
The complexity of Afghan social networks adds an additional 
wrinkle to the achievement of a time-information advantage. The civil 
environment is characterized by an innate mistrust of government, 
strong tribal loyalties and bitter clan rivalries, and a commercial 
exchange system that is so foreign as to be anathema to Westerners. 
Western, and particularly military, organizations are notoriously action-
oriented, and leaders feel compelled to move quickly—even 
prematurely—based on initial impressions of need. In Helmand, leaders 
soon learned that this well-intentioned desire for rapid assistance had to 
be tempered with exhaustive, highly formalized discussions with 
trusted local Afghani leaders. For instance, the perceived need to 
restore reliable irrigation to the agriculture-dependent province had to 
take into consideration the near-exclusive cultivation of opium poppies 
as the primary cash crop. If restoration of the irrigation system were not 
                                                     
35 Admiral M. G. Mullen, “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations,” 
version 3.0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009), 14. Available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare. 
36 Robert Perito et al., Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and 
Recommendations (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, Princeton University, 2008), 42–46. 
37 Peter Dahl Thruelson, “Counterinsurgency and a Comprehensive 
Approach: Helmand Province, Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, 2008;7. 
Available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/100-thruelsen.pdf. 
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accompanied by incentives for legitimate farming and poppy 
eradication, assistance efforts would inadvertently fuel opium 
production. Similarly, the intuitive move to establish a powerful 
military presence proved counterproductive because it fueled 
antioccupation sympathies and Taliban recruitment. Clearly, the 
challenge was not simply to take action quickly but to exploit 
information to take the correct actions.38  
To synchronize actions to be both rapid and effective, the Road Map 
demands close cooperation between civil and military stakeholders and 
frequent interaction with local Afghan leaders. The Road Map further 
describes eight steps of integrated action. 
Step 1: Begin a civilian-led effort to prioritize the various 
actors’ goals.  
Step 2: Identify those collective actions necessary to achieve 
desired effects.  
Step 3: Synchronize roles and responsibilities for all 
participants.  
Step 4: Analyze and approve available resources.  
Step 5: Develop an integrated resource plan.  
Step 6: Carry out preparations and tactical planning.  
Step 7: Execute integrated civil–military operations.  
Step 8: Consolidate and evaluate desired effects.39  
Priorities will often originate from discussions with trusted Afghan 
tribal leaders. Close daily interaction between the top civilian and 
military leaders ensures they share a common understanding of the 
immediate situation and assists the civilian PRT chief in assigning 
weights and directing focus. This cooperative feedback and immediate-
decision capability may lead to rapid adjustments in the delivery of 
civilian services and security without necessitating a formal planning 
                                                     
38 Rene L. Cote, “Data-Driven Stabilization: The Process of Selecting 
Reconstruction and Development Efforts,” 4th Civil Affairs Group, U.S. 
Marine Corps, Anacostia Annex, Washington, DC, July 13, 2007, 2–3. 
Available at http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/Data-
Driven%20Stabilization.pdf [Accessed March 5, 2009]. 
39 Thruelson, “Counterinsurgency,” 8. 
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process. Similarly, in hostile environments where security is the 
overriding priority, civilian actors may have little or no involvement in 
the planning and delivery of security services, which lie almost 
exclusively under military purview. 
In tandem with this internal synchronization, TF Helmand adopted a 
structured approach to collecting information that could first identify 
the root causes of instability or conflict, then determine whether the 
actions taken by the PRT were achieving their intended effects. The 
PRT opted to adopt an assessment tool developed by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development: the Tactical Conflict Assessment 
Framework (TCAF). The agency describes the TCAF as “a 
standardized diagnostic tool designed for use by both military and 
civilian personnel. It is employed to gather information from local 
inhabitants to identify the causes of instability or conflict in tactical 
areas of operation. This information helps identify, prioritize, monitor, 
evaluate, and adjust civil–military programming targeted at diminishing 
the causes of instability or conflict.”40 British leaders on the ground in 
Helmand confirm that this description fits their experience. According 
to Lieutenant Colonel Richard Wardlaw, commander of the Task 
Force’s 52 Brigade Engineers, "TCAF does more than just enable us to 
establish what the main problems are that cause instability. If you then 
keep asking those questions, over time you also get measurement of 
effect."41 
The task force began with a core assessment. Using military foot 
patrols that had already established trust with the local population, the 
TCAF assessment gathered essential information using four basic 
questions:  
1. Have there been any changes in the village population in 
the last year? Why?  
2. What is the most important problem facing the village? 
3. Who do you believe can solve your problems?  
                                                     
40 “Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework,” USAID Military Affairs 
Web site. Available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ 
ma/tcaf.html. 
41 As quoted by James Holland in “I Have Seen the Way Open for Hope in 




268  •  Moreland and Jaspers
 
4. What should be done first to help the village?42  
The open-ended nature of the questions encouraged dialogue and 
opportunities for locals to air grievances and concerns and, perhaps 
most important, capture their notions for a brighter future. These 
carefully framed questions also provided important insights about 
perceptions of the PRT’s mission and presence, and where local trust 
and loyalty resided. The same questions were repeated regularly over 
an extended period, so that effects from initial actions could be 
validated, fine-tuned, supplemented, or replaced by subsequent actions. 
Over time, the survey results identified and confirmed root causes and 
greatly facilitated the tracking of quantifiable trends and outcomes.  
TCAF is already producing results in Helmand. Results from data 
gathered in both Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital, and the city of 
Sangin using the TCAF evaluation tool indicated that earlier 
assumptions about each city’s grievances and needs had been quite 
wrong. Moreover, results in the two places were very different, 
showing how wide local differences can be. Based on this evaluation 
and new understanding, the Helmand PRT is reshaping reconstruction 
and development initiatives in these two cities so that actions will be 
more effective. Like all complex adaptive organizations, the Helmand 
PRT will continue to evolve. Based on the lessons learned in Helmand, 
military–political analysts are already suggesting two new 
organizational innovations for future PRT deployments: “mobile 
PRTs” that could follow troops immediately after combat operations, 
and “indigenous PRTs” led and populated by local civilians and 
augmented with foreign capacity-building and support.43 
The U.N.’s World Bank is also exploring more meaningful metrics 
that might reveal more effective approaches for combating poverty. 
World Bank concept leaders have made a remarkable departure from 
traditional poverty assessment. World Bank is now experimenting with 
a capabilities-based assessment model that is based on a comprehensive 
quality-of-life evaluation in place of a purely income-based “poverty-
line” metric. The central contention is that poverty is defined more 
succinctly as a “deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely a 
lowness of incomes.”44  
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The traditional infusions of money into the national coffers of 
poverty-stricken nations based on purely monetary metrics have too 
often yielded unexpected and even counterproductive results: inflation, 
corruption, and cultures of dependency. Recognizing this, in 2006, the 
World Bank initiated a limited-scope experiment to determine whether 
capabilities-based metrics might produce better solutions. 
Acknowledging that a number of factors contributed to the condition of 
poverty (e.g., availability of food, shelter, and security), the experiment 
focused on one indisputable capability requirement, “the capability to 
be adequately nourished” to establish one potential new poverty metric 
for comparison with the traditional income-based poverty line, using 
statistical data from Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Vietnam. The measure, 
caloric intake, was assumed to have a fixed criterion for adequate 
nourishment, set at 2,100 kilocalories, which established a sort of “food 
poverty line.” The experiment measured caloric intake in each of the 
three countries, taking into account, to the extent possible, the 
comparative nutritional values of each country’s typical diet. 
The results of the experiment revealed a notable divergence in these 
countries’ global poverty rankings with the application of the “food 
poverty” measures when contrasted against the “income poverty” line. 
In Vietnam, “nutritional” poverty was 84% higher than its comparable 
monetary indicator, whereas Tanzania enjoyed a 45% decrease in 
poverty with the application of the “food poverty” line.45 
This experiment is important primarily in that it illustrates the need 
to determine root causal relationships for effective evaluation. The 
World Bank experimentation team acknowledged that adequate 
sustenance was only one of many true poverty indicators, but that, in 
general, “the possession of elementary capabilities provides an 
approach to international poverty comparison and aggregation that is 
both coherent and meaningful, unlike existing money-metric 
approaches.” The radical, but retrospectively obvious, conclusion that 
access to money is only one contributor to a holistic set of basic 
“capabilities gaps” that define poverty should lead to more effective 
World Bank approaches. The results from this experiment and future 
capabilities-based evaluations will contribute to a more comprehensive 
                                                                                                                    
Toronto: Center for International Studies, 2006, 1. Available at 
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45 Ibid., 3-4, 16–18.  
  
270  •  Moreland and Jaspers
 
understanding of poverty, which should lead to more effective shaping 
of conditions to enhance poverty eradication actions. 
Conclusion 
Information Age organizations are complex and dynamic “living” 
entities that interact with and influence their environments. People are 
the building blocks: creative and intelligent components with a latent 
ability to produce not only stipulated outcomes but also novel ideas and 
achievements. When visualized and treated as complex adaptive 
systems, organizations more readily take advantage of emergent 
technologies, as well as the human potential to innovate and adapt. To 
realize their full potential, complex adaptive organizations must also be 
capable of managing and even encouraging change.  
Adaptive organizations possess markedly cooperative characteristics 
that operate on trust, the open flow of information, and a readiness to 
incorporate technological innovation. They are not based on or hostage 
to a set of inviolate roles, policies, and structures that form the rigid 
pillars for success. Rather, they purposefully reconfigure these 
important organizational components to support new projects or 
activities. Deliberate adaptation demands an improved ability to 
understand the operating environment and underlying causal 
relationships, to shape the organization and its contextual conditions for 
optimal performance, to act effectively to exploit opportunities to exert 
influence, and to evaluate outcomes to sustain competitive advantage. 
Actions are followed by a careful assessment of results in relation to 
expectations, which enhances understanding and leads to subsequent 
adaptations. 
In the Information Age, intuition must be integrated with reasoning 
for optimal decision-making ability. Intuition alone may not be reliable 
in unfamiliar situations, whereas reasoning can be aided tremendously 
by networked information. Four cognitive abilities are particularly 
important in organizational adaptation: understand → shape → act → 
evaluate. These cognitive abilities must not be concentrated among the 
few at the organizational core but, instead, distributed across the many 
in the field, who must in turn be trusted with unfettered access to the 
information network, authority to act, and opportunities to collaborate 
horizontally without deference to a higher authority. In complex 
adaptive organizations, the comfort of control must yield to the power 
of innovation. 
